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I. INTRODUCTION
Experts predict that a desperate global desire for the Arctic's
natural resources will be the catalyst for the next cold war unless the
question of sovereignty in the Northwest Passage and surrounding
Arctic waterways is finally settled.' The shield of Arctic ice that
once protected the "planet's most fragile and pristine ecosystem" is
melting at an alarming rate, leaving Canada's Northern Region
increasingly vulnerable to international exploitation and
environmental devastation. 2  Unless Arctic access is carefully
regulated, foreign-owned vessels, including oil tankers, cruise ships,
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1. Tim Reid, Arctic Military Bases Signal New Cold War, LONDON TIMES,
Aug. 11, 2007, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/
world/usandamericas/article2238243.ece. For the purposes of this Article, the
terms Arctic, North, and Arctic Archipelago connote the islands, waters, and ice of
the archipelago which forms the northernmost extremity of North America.
2. Marsha Walton, Countries in Tug-of- War over Arctic Resources, CNN.COM,
Jan. 2, 2009,
http://www.cnn.com/2009/TECH/science/01/02/arctic.rights.dispute/index.html?ire
f=newssearch.
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and submarines, will have largely unrestricted passage through
Canada's Northern Region; this without accountability for any
damage done during passage.3
Facing what experts agree is the "most important territorial dispute
of this century," the welfare of Canada's Northern Region is
dependent upon the quality of protection afforded its adjoining Arctic
waters. 4  Scholars continue to suggest an international Arctic
management system to quiet, rather than solve this problem;
however, this solution leaves Canada's Arctic citizens and Arctic
ecosystem without a voice and without a defense. 5 Instead, this Note
contends that a feasible Arctic solution must promote socio-economic
stability for Arctic residents while also preserving the indigenous
culture and integrity of the Arctic ecosystem. As recently as March
of 2009, the former executive director of the United Nations'
Environment Program stated that Canada has over a dozen unique
advantages, which other nations lack, for protecting and studying the
Arctic. 6 The purpose of this Note is to embrace those advantages,
thereby proving that the well-being of both Northern Canadians and
the Arctic ecosystem hinges on Canadian Arctic sovereignty. This
Note focuses on Canada's recent reassertion of Arctic sovereignty, its
effectiveness in international law, and why Canadian sovereignty is
the only equitable solution for the modem Arctic.
The Arctic includes the land, sea, and ice north of the 65th
parallel.7 Although each Arctic nation can claim some Arctic
3. See Ken Crist, Program Associate, Woodrow Wilson International Center
for Scholars, Canada and the Arctic: Issues of Northern Sovereignty (Dec. 11,
2007),
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic-id=1420&fuseaction--topics.event_s
ummary&eventid=278388 (featuring panelists Rob Huebert, Associate Director,
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary and Michael Byers,
Academic Director, Liu Institute for Global Issues, University of British
Columbia).
4. Walton, supra note 2.
5. BATTLE FOR THE ARCTIC (CBC Documentaries 2009).
6. Margaret Munro, Panel Urges Canada to Pump Up Arctic Research,
CANWEST NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 5, 2009,
www.ipycanada.ca/c/documentlibrary/get-file?folderld=6&name=DLFE-267.pdf
(including Canada's knowledgeable indigenous populations and Canada's
proximity to the crisis).
7. Keith F. Miller, The Implications of UNCLOS for Canada's Regulatory
Jurisdiction in the Offshore: The 200 Mile Limit and the Continental Shelf, 30
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coastline, and the geographic Arctic is currently considered an
international region, this advocates for Canadian sovereignty over
the waters of the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. The Canadian Arctic
Archipelago is the world's largest high-arctic land area.8 Canada's
Arctic islands form the largest island group in the world, covering 1.3
million kilometers. 9 The islands are separated by straits, or narrow
channels, and this series of connected straits forms the Northwest
Passage, the accessible shipping route through the Arctic waterways.
10 The Northwest Passage is one of three distinct geographic areas at
the center of the sovereignty dispute.'" This Note will also discuss
Canadian sovereignty in the Northwest Passage, as this dispute will
ultimately have an impact upon any nation wishing to ship, research,
or obtain resources within this area.12
DALHOUSIE L.J. 341, 342 (2007); Mike Perry, Rights of Passage: Canadian
Sovereignty and International Law in the Arctic, 74 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 657,
657 n.2 (1997). The Arctic Basin includes the Arctic Ocean and the circumpolar
seas: the Barents, Kara, Siberian, and Chukchi Seas. Miller, supra. The Arctic
littoral comprises northern Alaska and Canada, the complete northern shores of the
former Soviet Union and associated islands, and the approach, consisting of the
Bering Strait, the Greenland Norwegian Seas, and Iceland. Id.
8. Suzanne Lalonde, Increased Traffic Through Canadian Arctic Waters:
Canada's State of Readiness, 38 REVUE JURIDIQUE THEMIS [R.J.T.] 49, 53 n.1
(2004) (Can.) (excluding Greenland, which is almost entirely ice covered and is
considered a geographic extension of the archipelago); Miller, supra note 7, at 342
(distinguishing between an international region, an area beyond a nation's
territorial sea, and a nation's sovereignty in internal waters)'.
9. Lalonde, supra note 8, at 53 n.1.
10. Id. The Parry Channel runs from Lancaster Sound to the M'Clure Strait and
is large enough to qualify as a sea were it located somewhere other than the Arctic.
Oliver Burkeman, A Very Cold War Indeed, GUARDIAN, Apr. 5, 2008, at 16,
available at
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/05/poles.endangeredhabitats.
This particular channel is an important route through the Northwest Passage. Id.
See also Christopher Mark Macneill, Gaining Command and Control of the
Northwest Passage: Strait Talk on Sovereignty, 34 TRANSP. L.J. 355, 365 (2007)
(noting that the Northwest Passage is critical to Arctic trade development).
11. Keith Lewis, Deputy Dir., Oceans and Env't Law Div., Dep't of Foreign
Affairs & Int'l Trade, Address at the Inuvik Petroleum Show: Arctic Sovereignty:
Myths & Reality (June 11, 2008) (PowerPoint presentation available at
http://www.inuvik.ca/events/pdf/KeithLewis.pdf).
12. Id. (noting that the dispute is over the legal status of these waters and not
over ownership); see Macneill, supra note 10, at 365 n.59 (noting importance of
the Northwest Passage in Arctic trade development).
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Canada's strongest argument for sovereignty is its drawing of
straight baselines, which enclose the waters of the Arctic Archipelago
as internal waters.' 3 This Note first argues the validity of its straight
baselines, and its use as a legitimate claim to Arctic sovereignty.
Second, this Note recommends that Canada reinforce its claim by
arguing sovereignty under Historic Consolidation of Title. This
doctrine serves as a subsidiary basis in order to consolidate the title
resulting from Canada's use of the straight baseline system. 14 This
Note offers a modern and timely interpretation of sovereignty under
Historic Consolidation of Title. The analysis presents the legal
merits of Canada's claim under this doctrine and demonstrates
Canada's ability to exercise effective control over the Arctic. The
term control is redefined under this doctrine to encompass a nation's
ability to enforce its environmental and cultural preservation policies.
Despite grumblings from the international community,
environmental and cultural responsibility is now indivisible from a
nation's right to Arctic sovereignty. 15  This Note advocates the
established policy that the nation with the greatest risk of irrevocable
damage is the most effective at preventing harm. 16 Because welfare
of both northern Canadians and the Arctic ecosystem is best
promoted through Canadian management, Canadian sovereignty is
the only equitable solution for the modern Arctic. 17
13. Canada: Statement Concerning Arctic Sovereignty, Statement by the
Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, in the House of Commons Sept.
10, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1723, 1724 (declaring that the Arctic Islands and the Northwest
Passage were under Canadian jurisdiction and formalizing the Territorial Sea
Graphical Co-ordinates and baselines).
14. DONAT PHARAND, CANADA'S ARCTIC WATERS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
145-46 (1988).
15. James Raffan, Policing the Passage, GLOBE & MAIL, Sept. 1, 2008, at A10;
Walton, supra note 2.
16. CHARLOTTE BREIDE & PHILLIP SAUNDERS, LEGAL CHALLENGES FOR THE
CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE HIGH SEAS AND AREAS OF NATIONAL
JURISDICTION 82 ('2005).
17. Chuck Strahl, Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, Arctic
Plan is in Place, Says Strahl, NATIONAL POST, Dec. 20, 2008, at A21.
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II. THE VALUE OF SOVEREIGNTY TO CANADIANS
A State's sovereignty is often tantamount to a nation's political and
economic independence.' A coastal state has full sovereignty over
both its internal waters and its territorial sea, however, exclusive
autonomy occurs only within the internal waterways. 19  The
independence of internal waters entitles a coastal state, like Canada,
to fully protect its environment and national security. A coastal
state may refuse passage to a foreign flagged vessel, especially if the
vessel is considered a "risky ship." 21 A risky ship is, for example, a
vessel that threatens a coastal state's security or one that carries
radioactive wastes or other dangerous substances.22 A ship not of the
proper Polar Class, and therefore unable to safely navigate the Arctic
environment, is also considered a risky ship. 23 Equally important to
the ability to prohibit a ship's passage is a sovereign nation's right to
impose stringent environmental standards on those ships to which
24passage is granted. To ensure compliance, a coastal state can
exercise maximum jurisdiction over those ships entering its internal
waters. 25
Beyond a State's internal waters the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) authorizes a coastal state to designate
a limit of twelve nautical miles as its territorial sea. 26 Under Article
18. Donald McRae, Arctic Sovereignty? What Is at Stake?, 64 BEHIND
HEADLINES' 1, 2 (2007).
19. See DAVID L. VANDERZWAAG ET AL., MARINE & ENVTL L. INST.,
DALHOUSIE UNIVERSITY, IN GOVERNANCE OF ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING 4-5 (2008)
(including a discussion of sovereignty over internal waters and the coastal state's
sovereignty over the territorial sea).
20. See id. at 5 (describing a coastal state's entitlement to exercise a far
reaching power over its internal waters). A coastal state has the customary duty to
offer refuge to a ship in distress. Id.
21. Id. at 4-5
22. Id. at 5.
23. See id. (including substandard ships as a "risky ship); see also id. at 17-18
(explaining that Polar Class requirements established by the International Maritime
Organization Arctic Guidelines and the Unified Guidelines set the minimum ship
standards). These guidelines include operation safety and pollution reduction
requirements. Id.
24. See id. at 5 (including a "zero discharge" limit on ship-source pollutants).
25. Id. at 4-5.
26. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397
[hereinafter UNCLOS].
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3, the territorial sea is measured from a coastal state's baselines. 27
Unlike in internal waterways, Article 19 curbs a coastal state's
jurisdiction over foreign-flagged vessels.28 A coastal state must
allow innocent passage of a foreign ship and can only enforce
domestic laws in relation to navigation, marine preservation and
pollution prevention.29 The degree of environmental protection
allowed within the territorial sea remains a point of contention
between coastal states and flag states, and for that reason, the goal of
the coastal state is to maximize the area considered sovereign internal
waters.
30
To many Canadians, however, Arctic sovereignty represents more
than maritime control. It is synonymous with the preservation of
Canada's national heritage in the north and the acknowledgment of
the ownership rights of Canada's indigenous people. 3 1 To others,
arctic sovereignty also means finally protecting from other nations
what is considered rightfully Canadian. 32 Arctic sovereignty would
ensure that Canada, the nation best able to protect the Arctic, is at the
helm of any new development. 33 "Protecting national sovereignty,
the integrity of our borders, is the first and foremost responsibility of
a national government," stated Canada's Prime Minister, Steven
Harper.
34
27. Id. art. 3.
28. Id. art. 19.
29. Id. Non-innocent passage includes willful pollution, unauthorized research,
and military activities. Id. A coastal state is prohibited from imposing additional
construction or crewing requirements. Id. art. 21.
30. See VANDERZWAAG ET AL., supra note 19, at 6 (explaining the ongoing
tension between coastal states wishing to maximize marine environmental
protection and flag states wanting to maximize freedom of navigation); see also
McRae, supra note 18 (highlighting the importance of internal waters).
31. McRae, supra note 18, at 1. Mary May Simon, President, Inuit Tapiriit
Kanatami, Lecture at the University of Waterloo: Inuit and the Canadian Arctic:
Sovereignty Begins at Home (Mar. 3, 2009) (noting the political, social, and
economic place the Inuit hold in Canada's Arctic).
32. See McRae, supra note 18, at 1.
33. See J. Sheppard, Robert Huebert on Canada and Arctic Sovereignty,
GLOBEANDMAIL.COM, Mar. 31, 2009,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/opinions/article704436.ece (regarding
comments by expert Rob Huebert that Canada must prove they are the nation that
will most effectively protect the waterways).
34. Reid, supra note 1.
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY IN A
CHANGING ARCTIC
Climate change, coupled with the global drive for natural
resources, calls for a reevaluation of the traditional methods for
determining sovereignty. 35  It is no longer appropriate to award
sovereignty to the nation with the most impressive military fortress
around its border. 36 Nor is it reasonable to chance the welfare of
Canada's northern region to the ruse that is the regulation and
protection afforded under international law.3 7 Although Canada has
always maintained that the Arctic waterways are internal waters,
other Arctic nations repeatedly undermined Canadian sovereignty
because Canada had not yet established a legitimate claim at
international law. 38 That was then. The Canada of today has taken
steps to ensure that its argument is as solid as ice.39 For Canadians,
the stakes have never been higher. 40
This past fall, Canada unsheathed its sword and demanded that the
international community recognize its Arctic sovereignty. 41  In
August of 2008, Prime Minister Steven Harper announced the new
Canadian Arctic agenda, which incorporates two new policy
35. See Perry, supra note 7, at 667 (explaining that the principles of equity
impose a new way to evaluate sovereignty).
36. P. Whitney Lackenbauer, Arctic Front, Arctic Homeland: Re-Evaluating
Canada's Past Record and Future Prospects in the Circumpolar North 4-5 (July
2008) (Canadian International Council, Preliminary Paper).
37. Robyn Frost, Underwater Cultural Heritage Protection, 23 AUSTL. Y.B.
INT'L L. 25, 36-37 (2004) (comparing the environmentally beneficial Canadian
Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act with the "ineffective current state of
international law" and any claimed international basis for such regulations).
38. CBC News, Inuit Leader Demands Input on Arctic Sovereignty, CBC.CA,
Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/northlstory/2007/08/22/north-arctic.html.
Canada, along with Denmark, Norway (via Greenland), Russia, Sweden, Iceland,
Finland, and the United States (via Alaska) are considered the "Arctic nations"
because they surround the North Pole. Walton, supra note 2. The North Pole is
delineated by the Arctic Circle.
39. Raffan, supra note 15.
40. See Crist, supra note 3 (explaining potential environmental harm and the
threat to Canada's residents).
41. CBC News, Harper Talks Tough on Arctic Enforcement, CBC,
http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2008/08/27/north-ships.html (Aug. 27, 2008)
[hereinafter Enforcement].
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initiatives to facilitate Canadian control over the region. 42  First,
Prime Minister Harper announced a new provision mandating that all
ships entering the Northwest Passage register with the Canadian
Coastguard.43 Second, the Prime Minister, with the support of
Transport Canada, introduced a new bill that extends the protection
of the Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act (AWPPA) by one
hundred nautical miles. 4 4  As the historical world leader in
environmentalism, Canada is the only nation prepared to protect
those living in its Northern Region from exploitation and
environmental devastation.
45
A. International Interference Will Harm Canada's Northern
Region
Historically, for an area so little visited and so distant, Canada's
Northern Region, the Northwest Passage in particular, has long
played an integral role in the imagination of the Western world.46
The famed Northwest Passage is bordered by three Canadian
territories: Nunavut, Yukon, and Northwest Territories (NWT).47
Russia, Denmark, and the United States claim limited coastline along
the Northwest Passage, however, the majority of coastline belongs to
Canada.48 The Bering Strait is the only entrance from the west,
connecting the northern Pacific Ocean to the Canadian Arctic
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 2003 S.C., ch. A-12 (Can.);
Raffan, supra note 15; Transport Canada, About Transport Canada,
http://www.tc.gc.ca/aboutus/menu.htm (last visited Mar. 6, 2009). Transport
Canada is responsible for the waterways inside and surrounding Canada. Id.
45. BATTLE FOR THE ARCTIC, supra note 5.
46. Frommer's, Introduction to Yukon, the Northwest Territories, and Nunavut,
N.Y. TIMES, http://travel.nytimes.com/frommers/travel/guides/north-
america/canada/yukon-the-northwest-territories-and-nunavut/frm-yukon-the-
3048010001 .html?scp= 1 &sq=Introduction%20to%2OYukon,%20the%20Northwe
st%20Territories,%20and%20Nunavut&st-tcse (last visited Jan. 9, 2010) (featuring
Frommer's travel information regarding touring the Northwest Passage as part of
the New York Times' online travel guide, "the Northwest Passage ha[s] conjured up
powerful images of rugged determination in an untamed and harsh wilderness").
47. Id.
48. Stephanie Holmes, Comment, Breaking the Ice: Emerging Legal Issues in
Arctic Sovereignty, 9 CHI. J. INT'L L. 323, 326 (2008).
[VOL. XX
DIRE STRAITS
Archipelago. 49 Nunavut is on the Passage's eastern border, sharing
shores with the Davis Strait and Baffin Bay.50  The waters of the
Canadian Arctic archipelago encompass the five recognized routes
through the Northwest Passage. 51 However, only two of the five
routes are fully accessible at this time and either would take two
weeks to travel.52
As a result of global warming, 2007 marked the first year that a
portion of the Northwest Passage was free of ice. 53 This dramatic
reduction in sea ice will increase both shipping accessibility and the
opportunity for energy exploration. 54 Arctic scholars warn that a rise
in shipping activity within Northwest Passage places Canadians
living in Nunavut, NWT, and Yukon at risk.55 Furthermore, any
foreign claim to the potential oil and mineral reserves will likely have
49. M.P.M. REDDY, DESCRIPTIVE PHYSICAL OCEANOGRAPHY 14 (2001).
50. Id. at 14 (noting Baffin Bay connects the Central Arctic Region and the
Canadian Arctic Archipelago through a series of shallow channels); NASA, Visible
Earth: Davis Strait, http://visibleearth.nasa.gov/view-rec.php?id=3792 (last visited
Nov. 23, 2009) (explaining that the Davis Strait is located between Midwestern
Greenland and Baffin Island).
51. Donald R. Rothwell, The Canadian-U.S. Northwest Passage Dispute: A
Reassessment, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 331, 352 (1993).
Route I runs east to west runs through Davis Strait into Baffin Bay and
then west into Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, Viscount Melville Sound,
Prince of Wales Strait and then Amundsen Gulf Route III follows the
Parry Channel, but turns south through Peel Sound, Franklin Strait, Larsen
Sound, Victoria Strait, Queen Maud Gulf, Dease Strait, Coronation Gulf,
Dolphin and Union Strait, and into the Amundsen Gulf, where it exits
through the Barrow Strait. Route IV is slightly different than Route III, in
that ships pass to the east of Somerset Island through Prince Regent Inlet
to the Bellot Strait. Route V approaches from the east via Somerset Island
through Hudson Strait, Foxe Basin, Fury and Hecla Strait, and then
through the Gulf of Boothia to Bellot Strait, where it ultimately connects
with Route III.
Id. (noting that only Routes I and II are the accessible routes).
52. See CBC News, The Arctic Grail, CBC.CA, Aug. 8, 2006,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/northwest-passage/.
53. Raffan, supra note 15.
54. Id.; MATTHEW CARNAGHAN & ALLISON GOODY, LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT,
CANADIAN ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY 1 (2006). The Institute for the North and the
International Arctic Science Committee estimated that the Canadian Arctic will
experience entire summer seasons of ice-free conditions as early as 2050. Id.
55. Id.
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a disastrous effect upon those living in the Canadian Arctic. 56
Leading Arctic expert, Dr. Rob Huebert, Associate Director for the
Centre for Military and Strategic Studies at the University of Calgary,
anticipates that:
As the [Northwest] [P]assage becomes ice-
free,... Canada's northern sea routes will become
increasingly vulnerable to drug trafficking, as well as ships
carrying illegal immigrants, terrorists, or weapons of mass
destruction. If Canada's sovereignty over the Northwest
Passage were recognized internationally, the Canadian
government would have the ability to carry out maritime
interdictions that would not be possible if the strait were
considered international waters.
57
Huebert also suggests that economic development and climate
change pose enormous threats to the "extraordinarily fragile" Arctic
marine ecosystem.58 Experts caution that the Northwest Passage
could become a viable route to transport oil and gas, which vastly
increases the risk of a major oil spill in Canada's Arctic region. 59
This type of incident would be "catastrophic," not only for the Arctic
ecosystem, but also for Canada's Inuit population, as the Arctic is an
integral part of their culture. 60 Noting the direct environmental and
social impact such interference will have on Canada's vital state
interests, it is proper for Canada to take responsibility for Arctic
environmental protection and receipt of the potential energy
resources found therein.
6 1
B. The International Community's Disregard for Canadian
Sovereignty
The recent Canadian declaration of sovereignty has created a
conflictual relationship between the Arctic nations because these
56. Crist, supra note 3; Perry, supra note 7, at 657-58.
57. Crist, supra note 3.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. ARCTIC CLIMATE IMPACT ASSESSMENT (Carolyn Symon et al. eds., 2005)
[hereinafter ACIA].
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nations previously saw the Canadian Arctic agenda as heuristic at
best. 62 The international community adhered to an outdated belief
that Canada was not a "global player" or world power. 63 Whether a
world power or not, each Arctic nation has taken some legitimate
steps in an attempt to secure Arctic rights, although most acts have
been ineffectual grand gestures. 64  However, after the U.S.
Geological Survey estimated that 90 billion barrels of oil, 44 billion
barrels of natural gas liquids, and 1,670 trillion cubic feet of natural
gas are hidden below the world's smallest ocean, both the United
States and Russia have dialed up their efforts. 65 Arctic experts agree
that "whenever you mix undetermined boundaries, the potential of
very rich resources, and insert major powers such as Russia and the
United States, [nations will play] hardball; as a result, "[i]t could get
a lot more rough in the North.",
66
The United States, more subtle than Russia, is arguing both
geography and policy, and conducting extensive scientific research in
order to secure a claim to the natural resources. 67 The United States
continues to insist that the Northwest Passage is an international
strait, as defined under the United Nations Convention on the Law of
62. Lalonde, supra note 8, at 53. In decades past, Canada's assertion and
enforcement of Arctic sovereignty was considered somewhat lackadaisical. Id.
63. Id.
64. Burkeman, supra note 10, at 16. Canada and Denmark have maintained
dispute over Hans Island, located in a resource-rich channel between Greenland and
Canada's far north-east. Id. When the Danish government learned that the
Canadian government was researching on that island, the Danish government
minister planted a flag attached to a bottle of Danish Cognac. Id. Years later,
Canadian soldiers answered by leaving a bottle of Canadian rye whiskey. Id.
65. KENNETH J. BIRD, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, CIRCUM-ARCTIC
RESOURCE APPRAISAL: ESTIMATES OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS NORTH OF THE
ARCTIC CIRCLE (Peter H. Stauffer ed., 2008). The Arctic Ocean spans only 14
kilometers. Holmes, supra note 48, at' 325-26.
66. Steven Chase, Russia Won't Bully Canada in Arctic, Cannon Vows, GLOBE
& MAIL, Mar. 28, 2009, at A4.
67. Interview with Mike Cordray, Optical Imaging and Spectroscopy Lab, Rice
University Dep't of Bioengineering, in Houston, Tex. (Sept. 19, 2008) (explaining
that the amount of funding a country pours into Arctic research has been suggested
to imply a claim in the Arctic's resources); MEAD TREADWELL, UNITED STATES
ARCTIC RESEARCH COMMISSION (White House Council on Environmental Quality
and Interagency Office of the President, 2009) (summarizing current research
initiatives, including those funded by the National Science Foundation).
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68the Sea (UNCLOS). Although UNCLOS provides the basic
framework for the United States' argument, the United States refuses
to ratify the Convention.
69
The legal definition of an international strait consists of both a
geographical component and a functional component.7v In order to
satisfy the geographical component, the body of water must adjoin
two high seas.7 ' Because of the simplicity of this requirement, this
component is rarely the source of a dispute. 72
In order to meet the functional component, the strait must satisV
two elements. First, it must be "used for international navigation."
The textual interpretation of this requirement does not include those
bodies of water that are only potentially useful for navigation, like a
frozen waterway. 74 Second, if the strait is used for navigation, a strait
is considered to have met the functional component only when there
have been a sufficient number of transits to qualify it as a "useful
route for international maritime traffic."
' 75
However, it is not appropriate to evaluate the total number of
transits without considering whether those transits were authorized.76
If repetitive unauthorized vessels are considered to be "sufficient
use," there would be an increasing claim and perception that the
passage is an international strait, thereby jeopardizing a State's legal
claim of sovereignty.7 7 It is inequitable for nations to have the ability
to thwart Canadian sovereignty by incessant unauthorized transit of
the passage.
68. CBC News, Inuit Leader Demands Input on Arctic Sovereignty, CBC.CA,
Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2007/08/22/north-arctic.html.
69. UNCLOS, supra note 26. See Matthew Padilla, Comment, The Great
Thaw: National Security at the Top of a Melting World, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. &
POL'Y 52 (2008); see also Raffan, supra note 15, at 1-2.
70. CARNAGHAN & GOODY, supra note 54, at 4-5.
71. Id.
72. Id.; McRae, supra note 18, at 3 (providing the Malacca Strait, which joins
the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea, as an example of a body of water
which satisfies the geographic component).
73. McRae, supra note 18, at 3.
74. CARNAGHAN & GOODY, supra note 54, at 4 ("[A]n international strait must
also satisfy in the criterion of being a useful (not just potentially useful) route for
navigation . ... ).
75. Id. (quoting PHARAND, supra note 14, at 221-25).
76. Id.
77. Id.
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The climate crisis intensifies the dispute over the status of the
Northwest Passage. The first ever commercial passage took place as
recently as November of 2008 by a Canadian company for the sole
purpose of delivering supplies to the communities in western
Nunavut. 78 While this passage was domestic in nature, there is a
strong potential for international commercial shipping.79
The increased transit posits both environmental and national
security concerns for Canada. Should foreign nations treat the
Northwest Passage as an international strait, rather than as an internal
waterway, Canada's right to regulate shipping is circumscribed.80
The coastal state cannot prevent or impede transit in anyway,
something that it could do in the case of waters that are internal.8'
This right of transit extends such passage to submerged submarines
as well, creating a considerable national security concern.
82
A coastal state also has curtailed authority to regulate the transit
passage itself. "In respect [to] the prevention, reduction and control
of pollution, the coastal state can give effect only to 'international
standards' regarding the discharge of oil or other noxious
substances. 83  The reference to "international standards" is to
standards set by the agreement of states, often in treaties sponsored
by the International Maritime Organization. 84
At present, there is no indication that the United States will
concede that the Northwest Passage is a Canadian internal waterway,
although that is the most reasonable and equitable argument. Shortly
before leaving office, former President George W. Bush implied that,
in the interest of the potential fossil fuel wealth, the United States
will continue to consider the Northwest Passage an international
strait.85 In his response, Prime Minister Stephen Harper maintained
78. CBC News, 1st Commercial Ship Sails Through Northwest Passage,
CBC.CA, Nov. 28, 2008, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2008/11/28/nwest-
vessel.html.
79. Id.
80. McRae, supra note 18, at 2-3.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Id. at 3.
83. Id. at 2-3.
84. Id.
85. CBC News, supra note 38 (referring to the statement of a White House
official that declared, "[W]hile the meeting left Bush with a better understanding of
Canadian concerns, Harper's remarks did not change the traditional U.S. view: that
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the Canadian position, declaring that the Northwest Passage
constitutes internal waterways of Canada. 86 He stated, "[w]e have
some disagreements with the United States over the extent of our
sovereignty over Arctic waters. I've been very clear with President
Bush. This government will assert its sovereignty over all of its land
and sea territories."
' 87
Likewise, Canada is rebuking Russia's belligerent attempts to
undermine Canadian sovereignty.88  Russia's aggressive posturing
demonstrates its disregard for Canadian security and environmental
interests. 89 In a 2007 highly controversial show of bravado, Russia
sent a mini-submarine to plant a flag in the seabed near the North
Pole, symbolizing Russia's intentions for Arctic sovereignty. 90 The
Canadian Foreign Minister responded to this action by stating, "This
isn't the 15th Century .... You can't go around the world and just
plant flags and say, 'We're claiming this territory."' 91 Legal scholar,
Eric Posner, made the following remarks about the validity of
Russia's claim:
I take [the Russian flag-planting] as a signal that they're
going to claim this regardless of what the UN commission
is going to say sometime in the future .... Usually, they
Canada owns the Arctic islands, but not the vast and potentially resource-rich
waters that surround them."). This position was reemphasized by U.S. State
Department official Robert Fisk who stated, "[The U.S.] continue[s] to believe that
the Northwest Passage is an international waterway." Id. At the 2007 Montbello
Summit, then U.S. President George W. Bush stated, "Yes, we will manage the
differences. Because there are differences on the Northwest Passage. We believe it
is an international passageway." Lewis, supra note 11 at 12.
86. Id.
87. Jeff Davis, Canadian Response to New U.S. Arctic Policy Muted, EMBASSY
MAG., Jan. 21, 2009, http://www.portalfomorthamerica.org/pnacigi-
news/2009/01/canadian-response-new-us-arctic-policy-muted (quoting comments
made by Prime Minister Stephen Harper during an interview with a Calgary radio
station on January 13, 2009).
88. Chase, supra note 66.
89. BBC News, Russians to Dive Below North Pole, NEWS.BBC.CO.UK, July
24, 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/europe/6914178.stm. "The Arctic is
ours and we should demonstrate our presence[.]" Id. (quoting Russian legislator
Artur Chilingarov).
90. Id.
91. Reid, supra note 1.
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make a legalistic argument, which may be implausible, but
they make it anyway-and go ahead and do what they want
to do.
92
Professor Posner's prediction proved true on February 18, 2009
when Russia sent two bombers over the Canadian arctic. 93 Canadian
forces turned them away from Yukon about two hundred kilometers
from Canadian airspace. 94  Dangerous news from Moscow came
again on March 27, 2009 when the Russian Presidential Security
Counsel revealed its intention to secure the Arctic as Russia's
primary natural resources supply.95 Russia also announced its plan to
establish a special Arctic military force to ensure a Russian military
presence.96  Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lawrence Cannon
resolutely stated, "Let's be perfectly clear here; Canada will not be
bullied.",97 Because an international sovereignty decision is outcome
determinative for the security of Canadians, asserting Canadian
sovereignty is "uppermost for [the Canadian government]" and
Canada "will not be swayed from this [position]."98  Canadian
Defense Minister Peter MacKay announced that the government's
response includes options to improve surveillance and response
capabilities, increase patrol ships, and an expansion of its armed
reserves, the Canadian Rangers. 
99
92. Burkeman, supra note 10, at 16.
93. CBC News, Canada Won't be 'Bullied' over Arctic, Cannon Tells Russians,
CBC.CA, Mar. 27, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2009/03/27/arctic-
canon.html.
94. Id.
95. Chase, supra note 66; BBC News, Russia Outlines Arctic Force Plan,
NEWS.BBC.CO.UK, Mar. 27, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7967973.stm.
96. Chase, supra note 66; BBC News, supra note 95.
97. Chase, supra note 66.
98. Id.; Press Release, Office of the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Harper
Delivers on Commitment to the "New North" (Mar. 10, 2008), available at
http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2015 (stating that Canadians have the
greatest stake in the consequences of a changing Arctic) [hereinafter New North].
99. Chase, supra note 66; CBC News, supra note 93.
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IV. THE CHALLENGE OF PROMOTING SocIo-ECONoMIc GROWTH
WHILE PRESERVING CANADA'S NORTHERN CULTURE
The Arctic is changing, and changing in ways that we do
not fully understand. As Canadians, we need to ensure that
we attempt to understand these changes and respond in a
manner that allows Canadian interests and values to be
protected and promoted. Of critical importance is the need
to ensure that the interests of Northern Canadians be at the
front of such a policy. 100
Life in Nunavut, NWT, and Yukon requires a balance between
vulnerability and resiliency, and the above comments by Arctic
expert Dr. Rob Huebert exemplify those challenges. 10 1  Prime
Minister Harper recently noted that the "people of the Arctic are as
much a part of Canada's identity as the red maple leaf," and
therefore, Canada is prepared to protect the interests of those living in
its largest region.' 
02
The territory of Nunavut, Canada's newest and largest territory, is
roughly the size of Western Europe. 103 While the capital, Iqaluit, is
primarily non-Inuit, eighty-four percent of Nunavut's residents are
Inuit. 104 NWT is home to approximately 40,000 Canadians, with half
the population being indigenous.' 05 The people who belong to the
recognized indigenous populations are members of First Nations,
Inuit, and M~tis.' °6 NWT has eleven official languages, nine of
which are indigenous. 1
07
100. Sheppard, supra note 33.
101. ACIA, supra note 61, at 4; Sheppard, supra note 33.
102. New North, supra note 98.
103. Nunavut Act, 1993 S.C., ch. 28, s. 3 (Can.). The Northwest Passage lines
Nunavut, which stretches from the North Pole to Ontario's James Bay. Id.
104. Government of Nunavut, http://www.gov.nu.ca/english/ (last visited Nov.
13, 2008) [hereinafter Nunavut].
105. Government of the Northwest Territories, http://www.gov.nt.ca/ (last visited
Oct. 20, 2009).
106. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, ch. 11.
107. Official Languages Act, R.S.N.W.T. 1988, ch. 0-1, amended by S.N.W.T.
2003, ch. 23 (Can.).
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Yukon, the third Arctic territory, is situated between Alaska, NWT,
and British Columbia. 10 8  Yukon has 430 kilometers of shoreline
along the Beaufort Sea, where it meets the Northwest Passage.
10 9
The indigenous community, First Nations, has an independent
government recognized under the Canadian Constitution.' 
10
A. The Revitalized Voice of the Indigenous People
Arctic policy has become increasingly important to the citizens of
Canada. Steven Harper's 2008 re-election to Prime Minister was
based, in part, on his Arctic agenda to achieve sovereignty.111 The
Canadian government continues to focus increased energy and
resources on the Arctic territories of Nunavut, NWT, and Yukon. 
112
The 1999 confederation of Nunavut is perhaps the most important
step Canada has taken towards Arctic sovereignty. 113 The creation of
Nunavut redressed the federal government's past treatment of the
Inuit and provided Nunavut's Inuit an opportunity to partake in
Canadian legislation. 114 Nunavut is now the only self-governing state
108. YUKON AT A GLANCE 3 (2008) available at
http://www.gov.yk.ca/pdf/yukon-at-a-glance-web2.pdf.
109. Id. at 5; CORDILLERA REGION OF CANADA 2-4 (2004).
110. YUKON AT A GLANCE, supra note 108.
111. Keith Richburg, Canada's Harper Returned to Power as Prime Minister,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at A16. Harper is a member of the Conservative Party
of Canada. Id.
112. See CBC News, supra note 41 (during Prime Minister Harper's tour of the
Arctic territories he explained the government's goals for the region); see also CBC
News, Harper Promises to Cut Red Tape in the North, CBC.CA, Sept. 20, 2008,
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canadavotes/story/2008/09/
20/harper-iqaluit.html (discussing plans to invest in Canada's Arctic).
113. See Perry, supra note 7, at 675 (discussing the upcoming importance of
Nunavut); see also CBC News, supra note 112 (discussing the value of Canada's
Arctic).
114. See VALERIE ALIA, NAMES AND NUNAVUT: CULTURE AND IDENTITY IN THE
INuIT HOMELAND 63-64 (2006) (noting that the creation of Nunavut, part of the
restitution process, brings the Inuit more "dignity and control over their resources
and their lives"). Occupation is a factor in sovereignty determination, and experts
agree that the High Arctic Relocation was a strategic geopolitical move. Canadian
Arctic Resources Committee, Policy Issues, 19 NORTHERN PERSPECTIVES (1991),
available at http://www.carc.org/pubs/vl9no4/2.htm (citing DANIEL SOBERMAN,
CANADIAN HUMAN RIGHTS COMM'N, INUIT RELOCATION '(1992)); ROYAL
COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, THE HIGH ARCTIC RELOCATION: A REPORT
ON THE 1953-55 RELOCATION (1994). As part of the restitution process, Canadian
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to be established for the benefit of indigenous people in the entire
world.'15 With the creation of Nunavut, the Inuit received important
political recognition and autonomy which has solidified a Canadian
government presence in the Arctic. 116
Leona Aglukkaq, a strong supporter of Harper, is the first Inuit
Cabinet Minster. l l 7  She is currently serving simultaneously as
Nunavut's Member of Parliament and as Canada's Minister for
Health. 118 She offers a personal voice for the Canadian Inuit. 11 Her
first language was Inukitut, and she remains close to the Inuit culture,
despite now working in Ottawa.' The president of the Inuit land-
claims organization, Nunavut Tunngavik Inc., noted the benefit of
having a Cabinet Minister who speaks the Inuit language and the
assurance it gives the Inuit people that the Canadian government is
concerned for their welfare. 121 Already, Aglukkaq is boosting federal
funding for Arctic health initiatives. 
122
NWT is also an important part of Canada's assertion of
sovereignty. 123 In August of 2008, Prime Minister Harper held a
school systems include the High Arctic Relocation in their curriculum. See
NUNAVUT DEPT. OF EDU., HIGH ARCTIC RELOCATION MODULE (2002)
(incorporating Zebedee Nungak, Exiles in the High Arctic, ARCTIC CIRCLE, Sept.-
Oct. 1990, at 36, into the tenth grade curriculum). The Confederation of Nunavut
legitimizes the claim of a Canadian presence in the Arctic. Perry, supra note 7, at
675.
115. MELANIE MCGRATH, THE LONG EXILE: A TALE OF INUIT BETRAYAL AND
SURVIVAL IN THE HIGH ARCTIC 262 (2007).
116. ELSPETH YOUNG, THIRD WORLD IN THE FIRST, DEVELOPMENT OF
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 1475-80 (1995).
117. Leona Aglukkaq, http://www.leonaaglukkaq.ca/EN/423/4933 (last visited
Nov. 9, 2008) [hereinafter Aglukkaq].
118. Id.
119. Jane Taber, Rookie Health Minister Fulfils Her Dream-and Then Some,
GLOBEANDMAIL.COM, Oct. 30, 2008,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/article719752.ece.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. CBC News, Northern Development Agency to Get $1OM Budget: Aglukkaq,
CBC.CA, Jan. 23, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2009/01/23/north-
dev.html.
123. Town of Inuvik, http://www.inuvik.ca/index.html (last visited Nov. 9,
2008).
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sovereignty-oriented press conference in NWT. 124 The city of Inuvik
was chosen for the conference because it is strategically located on
the northwest entrance into North America, as well as the western
entrance to the Northwest Passage.125 Inuvik is a Forward Operating
Location for Canada's Air Force, the essential supply base for the
western portion of the North Warning System, and, undoubtedly, a
window into the critical Arctic ecosystem.' 
26
B. Safe, Smart, & Sustainable. the Canadian Approach to Arctic
Development
The Canadian government is "committed to helping the [Arctic]
region and its residents realize their true potential." 127 The Canadian
government has been providing Nunavut with much needed funding
to ensure it has the modem infrastructure needed to maximize
success. 121 In 2006, Infrastructure Canada invested over $10 million
to modernize Nunavut's airport and to provide broadband access
throughout the territory. 129  This investment increases Canada's
ability to communicate and secure its most remote areas. 130 Nunavut
also depends on tourism."'1 31 As evidenced by Nunavut's national
tourism slogan, "Untamed, Unspoiled, Undiscovered," the future
growth of Nunavut is truly dependent on the protection of its natural
resources and its indigenous culture.' 
32
The creation of new jobs for NWT residents is a challenge
currently facing its economy. However, a Canadian-managed oil and
124. CBC News, Harper Lands in Inuvik for Northern Tour, CBC.CA, Aug. 27,
2008, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2008/08/27/north-harper.html.
125. Id.
126. Town of Inuvik, supra note 123.
127. New North, supra note 98.
128. Press Release, Infrastructure Canada, Canada's New Government Makes
Nunavut Airport Runways Safer With $1.2 Million Investment (Dec. 1, 2006),
available at http://www.infc.gc.ca/media/news-nouvelles/ptf-
ftc/2006/20061201 iqaluit-eng.html.
129. Id.
130. See Traveling in Nunavut, Nunavut Parks,
http://www.nunavutparks.ca/english/visitor-information/traveling-in-nunavut.html
(last visited Feb. 09, 2010) (noting that air travel is the primary way to reach
Nunavut, as very few roads are available to reach its communities).
131. Nunavut, http://www.nunavuttourism.com/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2010).
132. See id. (expressing the attraction of Nunavut's culture and ecosystem).
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gas industry will create new jobs for people living in NWT. 133
Canada is evaluating the possibility of a Canadian-owned and
operated gas pipeline in the Mackenzie Delta, with the expectation
that seventy-two percent of the Operations jobs created will go to
indigenous people and current NWT residents. 134 Because it is
unrealistic to expect no oil and gas development in the Arctic, it is
important to remember that a Canadian managed gas pipeline is
clearly better than a foreign run project for two reasons. Industry
experts agree that a domestic oil or gas pipeline poses less
environmental risk than transoceanic shipping.' 35 If the project was,
for instance, Russian-operated, international shipping would be
required to transport the oil. 136 The world's most damaging oil spills,
in frequency and severity, have been associated with such
shipping. 137
The Yukon Environmental and Socio-economic Assessment Board
(YESAB), established under the Yukon Environmental and Socio-
economic Assessment Act, is another example of Canada's
commitment to responsible Arctic development.' 38 YESAB oversees
Yukon's development programs, including The First Nations Forestry
Program. 139  The Forestry Program promotes sustainable
133. Government of the Northwest Territories, Industry, Tourism, and
Investment, http://www.iti.gov.nt.ca/MediaRoom/DYK.shtml#mog (last visited
Feb. 09, 2010).
134. 2 JOINT REVIEW PANEL FOR THE MACKENZIE GAS PROJECT, FOUNDATION
FOR A SUSTAINABLE NORTHERN FUTURE 463 (2009), available at
http://www.ngps.nt.ca/PDFs/JRPreport-vol-II.pdf. The project is anticipated to
generate up to sixteen percent of direct employment during the Construction phase,
creating an annual average of 5,707 direct jobs, of which twenty percent would go
to NWT residents. Id.
135. Telephone Interview with C. A. Gordy, Manager (Retired), Health,
Environment and Safety Compliance, Chevron Corporation (Mar. 16, 2009).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See YUKON TOURISM AND CULTURE, YUKON WILDERNESS TOURISM BEST
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES FOR HERITAGE RESOURCES 4 (2009), available at
http://www.tc.gov.yk.ca/pdf/WildernessTourismBMP-for-Heritage_Resources.p
df (YESAA oversees tourism programs to prevent damage to heritage resources).
139. An Act to Establish a Process for Assessing the Environmental and Socio-
Economic Effects of Certain Activities in Yukon, 2003 S.C., ch.7. (Can.); First
Nations Forestry Program, http://fnfp.cyfn.ca/ (last visited Mar. 15, 2009).
[VOL. XX
DIRE STRAITS
development and creates jobs within the First Nations
communities. 1
40
V. CANADA'S REASSERTION OF ARCTIC SOVEREIGNTY
In August of 2008, Prime Minister Harper stated, "We will be
sending a clear message to the world that our environmental
standards and sovereignty are not up for debate-if you are in
Canada's Arctic you will be playing by Canada's rules."' 141 Stephan
Harper's plan is clear.142 At a strategically located press conference
in Tuktoyaktuk, NWT, the western gate to the Northwest Passage, he
announced Canada's two elements of his sovereignty plan: (1)
increased Coastguard control, and (2) increased protection under the
AWPPA. 1
43
A. The Canadian Coastguard's Increased Enforcement
Capability
The first element of Canada's sovereignty platform, which will
come into force in 2010, imputes new power and responsibility upon
the Canadian Coastguard.144  Currently, all Ships of Particular
Interest must register 96 hours in advance. 145 A ship is identified as a
Ship of Particular Interest if it is deemed substandard after reviewing
past incidents, reports, and a third party assessment of ship quality. 146
Under the upcoming modification to the Canada Shipping Act 2001,
all large ships entering the Northwest Passage will be required to
register with NORDREG, the marine operating system for the
140. Id.
141. Vesna Jaksic, Canada Extends Jurisdiction over Arctic Waters, NAT'L L.J.,
Aug. 29, 2008, available at
http://www.law.con/j sp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id= 1202424125182&slreturn= 1 &h
bxlogin=l.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Office of the Prime Minister, Prime Minister Harper Announces
Measures to Stengthen Canada's Arctic Sovereignty and Protection of the Northern
Environment, Aug. 27, 2008, http://www.pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2259 (last
visited Feb. 9, 2010).
145. Transport Canada, Tanker Ship Safety in Canada Regulations and
Programs-May 2006, Oct. 22, 2007, http://www.tc.gc.ca/
mediaroom/backgrounders/b03-m002.htm.
146. Id.
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Canadian Coast Guard. 147  No longer voluntary, ship registration
before, during, and after passage will be required. 1
4 8
B. An Act to Amend the Arctic Waters Pollution
Prevention Act
Amplified protective legislation is the second element of the Arctic
platform. 149  Canada is now prepared to establish a bulwark to
safeguard the Northwest Passage and the people of the northern
region. 150 The Canadian Parliament is currently reviewing a bill to
strengthen AWPPA. 15 1 If passed, Bill C-3 will double the reach of
the AWPPA protection by establishing a two hundred nautical mile
pollution prevention zone in the Arctic waters. 1
52
The necessity for increased regulation became clear after the
Manhattan, an American-owned icebreaker, crossed the Northwest
Passage without Canadian permission. 5 3 In response, the AWPPA
was passed in 1970, predating UNCLOS by a decade.' 54 AWPPA's
one hundred mile pollution prevention zone is within Canada's
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), as set forth by UNCLOS. 155
Defined under UNCLOS, the EEZ extends out two hundred miles
from the bases from which the breadth of the territorial sea is
measured. 156 Within this zone, all international transit is permissible,
including submerged submarines, and a vessel is not required to show
its flag. 157 Canada may not regulate a foreign nation's placement of
147. See Canadian Coast Guard, www.ccg-gcc.gc.ca/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2008)
(explaining that The NORDREG system keeps track of all traffic north of 600, as
well as within Ungava Bay and the southern part of Hudson Bay).
148. Id.
149. Office of the Prime Minister, http://pm.gc.ca/eng/default.asp (last visited
Oct. 19, 2008).
150. Enforcement, supra note 41.
151. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 2003 S.C., ch. A-12 § 9 (Can.).
152. An Act to Amend Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 2009, Bill C-3,
4 0 th Parl. (Can.).
153. DONALD ROTHWELL & CHRISTOPHER JOYNER, PROTECTING THE POLAR
MARINE ENVIRONMENT: LAW AND POLICY FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION 150-51
(Davor Vidas ed., 2000). The voyage's only purpose was to demonstrate American
transit capabilities. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 57.
157. Id.
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pipelines and cables within its own EEZ.' 58 Under UNCLOS,
Canada cannot suspend passage and may only adopt ship-source
pollution laws if such laws are within international standards and are
applied equally to both domestic an foreign-flagged vessels. 159
Canada also may only undertake physical inspection of a foreign
ship, versus detention, where a violation has resulted in a substantial
discharge causing or threatening significant pollution of its marine
environment.16  Despite the fragile Arctic ecosystem, UNCLOS
Article 234 prohibits only those actions causing irreversible damage
to the ice-covered areas. 161 Finally, if a foreign state seriously harms
Canada's EEZ, UNCLOS offers only nominal remedies.' 
62
AWPPA, therefore, is preferable to UNCLOS because it ensures
that marine polluters are prosecuted under Canadian law. 163
AWPPA's pollution prevention zone prohibits all deposits of waste
by any person or ship. 164 Unlike UNCLOS, AWPPA has a
comprehensive definition of Arctic pollution.' 65 The Act defines
''waste" as:
(a) Any substance that, if added to any water, would
degrade or alter or form part of a process of degradation
or alteration of the quality of that water to an extent that
is detrimental to their use by man or by any animal, fish
or plant that is useful to man ....
(b) Any water that contains a substance in such a quantity
or concentration, or that has been so treated, processed
or changed, by heat or other means, from a natural state
158. OCEANS: THE SOURCE OF LIFE, UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW
OF THE SEA: 20TH ANNIVERSARY BROCHURE (2002), available at
http://secint50.un.org/issues/docs/documents/losenbrch.html.
159. UNCLOS, supra note 26, arts. 42, 45.
160. Id. art. 220(5).
161. Id. art. 234.
162. VANDERZWAAG ET AL., supra note 19, at 6.
163. See ROTHWELL & JOYNER, supra note 153, at 340 (citing the Canadian
Minister for External Affairs' comment that Canada was "not prepared to litigate
with other states on vital issues concerning [law that] is either inadequate, non-
existent or irrelevant to the kind of situation Canada faces, as in the case of the
Arctic." HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES (Hansard), vol. 6, (Apr. 16, 1970) at 5952
(Can.)).
164. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 2003 S.C., ch. A-12 § 9 (Can.).
165. See id.
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that it would, if added to any other water, degrade or
alter or form part of a process of degradation or
alteration of the quality of that water to the extent
described in paragraph (a)166
This is a much more effective definition of pollution than a general
statement against nebulous "irreversible damage."1 67  AWPPA
specifically prohibits the dumping of solid or liquid waste into
Canada's Arctic waters' 68 and requires an offender to notify Canada
immediately in the event of a spill.169 Discharge is only permitted if
it is permitted by other regulations for environmental purposes.'
70
Under AWPPA, the federal cabinet sub-divides Arctic waters into
shipping safety control zones and can pass regulations for vessel
construction, equipment, and navigation. 171  Pollution Prevention
Officers are given broad powers to board and inspect any ship within
a shipping safety control zone, to direct ships to remain outside a
zone, or to anchor in a place selected by the officer in case of safety
172
concerns.
The newly proposed amendment to AWPPA, Government Bill C-
3, received Royal Assent on June 11, 2009.173 Although, Canada's
other marine safety laws apply to the outer limits of the EEZ, this
amendment expands the application of AWPPA to govern waters two
hundred miles from its low water mark, making its protection extend
throughout the entire EEZ. 174 Although Second, C-3 will replace
AWPPA's definition of "Arctic Waters" with the following:
"Arctic waters" means the internal waters of Canada and
the waters of the territorial sea of Canada and the exclusive
166. Id. § 2(a).
167. UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 234.
168. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 2003 S.C., ch. A-12 § 9 (Can.).
169. Andrew Mayeda, Canada to Extend Arctic's Water-Pollution Prevention
Zone, GAZETTE (Montreal), Aug. 28, 2008, at A15.
170. Id.
171. The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 2003 S.C., ch. A-12 arts. 11,
12 (Can.).
172. Id. art. 14(4).
173. Bill C-3 [Act to Amend Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act], 40th Parl.
(2009).
174. Id.; Mayeda, supra note 169.
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economic zone of Canada, within the area enclosed by the
60th parallel of north latitude, the 141st meridian of west
longitude and the outer limit of the exclusive economic
zone; however, where the international boundary between
Canada and Greenland is less than 200 nautical miles from
the baselines of the territorial sea of Canada, the
international boundary shall be substituted for that outer
limit .... 175
The Canadian government has effectively announced that Canada
will be treating the Northwest Passage as an internal waterway and
not as an international strait. 176  The increased authority of the
Canadian Coastguard and the extension of AWPPA place Canada in a
propitious position to obtain Arctic sovereignty. 177
VI. BREAKING LEGAL ICE: CANADA'S CLAIM TO ARCTIC
SOVEREIGNTY is Now LEGITIMATE
Now is the time for Canada to assert its Arctic sovereignty.
178
There are two arguments for sovereignty that will break the legal ice
preventing Canada from taking full responsibility for the waterway's
175. Bill C-3 [Act to Amend Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act], 40th Parl.
(2009). The previous definition is below:
Arctic waters means the waters adjacent to the mainland and islands of the
Canadian arctic within the area enclosed by the sixtieth parallel of north
latitude, the one hundred and forty-first meridian of west longitude and a
line measured seaward from the nearest Canadian land a distance of one
hundred nautical miles, except that in the area between the islands of the
Canadian arctic and Greenland, where the line of equidistance between the
islands of the Canadian arctic and Greenland is less than one hundred
nautical miles from the nearest Canadian land, that line shall be substituted
for the line measured seaward one hundred nautical miles from the nearest
Canadian land.
The Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 2003 S.C., ch. A-12 (Can.). The word
"internal" is not used. Id.
176. McRae, supra note 18.
177. Steven Chase & Campbell Clark, Summer Melt Buoys PM's Bid to
Champion Arctic Sovereignty; Temporarily Navigable Northwest Passage
Reinforces Point of Harper Trip, GLOBEANDMAIL, Aug. 27, 2008, at A4.
178. CARNAGHAN & GOODY, supra note 54, at 6; Crist, supra note 3.
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protection.17 9  First, Canada can successfully assert sovereignty
through the validity of its straight baselines. 80  Second, modem
Canada can reinforce its claim by arguing sovereignty through the
doctrine of Historic Consolidation of Title. 181
A. Successful Application of the Straight Baselines System
Canada's most effective argument for sovereignty over the Arctic
Archipelago is the validity of its straight baselines, which were drawn
in 1986 to enclose the Northwest Passage. 182 Baselines mark the end
of a State's internal waters and the beginning of its maritime
extension and territorial sea. 183 Waters on the landward side of the
baseline are internal waters of the coastal state.1 84  The standard
method for delimiting the territorial sea is set forth in UNCLOS
Article 5, stating, "[T]he normal baseline for measuring the breadth
of the territorial sea is the low-water line along the coast .... , 
185
However, in the case of a coastal archipelago, like the Canadian
Arctic Archipelago, a coastal state is permitted under UNCLOS
Article7 delimit its territorial sea by drawing straight baselines from
headland to headland. 186 The Convention further provides for the
drawing of straight baselines where the coastline is deeply indented
or if there is a fringe of islands along the coast. 187 Likewise, the
waters landward of the straight baselines become internal waters, and
the coastal state enjoys the right to enforce its civil and criminal laws
179. FRANCOIS COTt & ROBERT DUFRESNE, THE ARCTIC: CANADA'S LEGAL
CLAIMS 3 (Parliamentary Info. and Res. Serv. Pub., PRB 08-05E, 2008); Perry,
supra note 7, at 667-83.
180. See Canada: Statement Concerning Arctic Sovereignty, Statement by the
Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark, in the House of Commons Sept.
10, 1985, 24 I.L.M. 1723 (declaring that the Arctic Islands and the Northwest
Passage were under Canadian jurisdiction and formalizing the Territorial Sea
Graphical Co-ordinates and baselines).
181. See The Grisbadarna Case (Nor. v. Swed.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121, 130
(1916) (dictating the criteria to evaluate a nation's contention of title via historic
consolidation). Perry, supra note 7, at 666.
182. ROTHWELL & JOYNER, supra note 153, at 153.
183. See COTt & DUFRESNE, supra note 179, at 2.
184. UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 8(1).
185. Id., art. 5.
186. Id., art. 7; David VanderZwaag & Donat Pharand, Inuit and the Ice:
Implications for Canadian Waters, 21 CAN. Y.B. INT'L L. 53, 59 (1983).
187. UNCLOS, supra note 26, art. 7.
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therein. 188 The Canadian Arctic Archipelago is directly implicated
by Article 7.189
Canada's decision to draw of straight baselines is an accepted
practice at international law, 190 and has been so since the 1951
Norwegian Fisheries Case.191 The great majority of coastal states
have chosen to enclose their respective internal waters through
straight baselines, and Canada's use of the technique should be
accredited the same respect. 192  In the Fisheries Case, the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) established two compulsory
requirements to delimit the legal baselines around coastal regions: (1)
baselines must not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
direction of the coastline; and (2) the waters lying within the
baselines must be closely linked to the coastal State's domain as to be
considered internal waters; and a third non-compulsory factor, (3) the
waters represent economic interests which are particular to the region
and which have an importance evidenced by a long history of use.
1 93
The Canadian baselines satisfy each factor.' 
94
188. See C6TIt & DUFRESNE, supra note 179, at 2 (citing T. L. McDorman, In the
Wake of the Polar Sea: Canadian Jurisdiction in the Northwest Passage, 10
MARINE POL'Y 243, 243-57 (1986)).
189. See VanderZwaag & Pharand, supra note 186, at 62 (defining Canada's
Arctic islands as a coastal archipelago). Canada's Arctic Archipelago qualifies
because it forms a visual unity with the rest of Canada and numerous islands link
the northern and southern sections of the Archipelago. Id.
190. See PHARAND, supra note 14, at 155 (noting that by 1985, sixty States had
used the straight baseline system and twelve more had adopted enabling
legislation).
191. See Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 115 (Dec. 19); see also Mark
Jarashow, Michael B. Runnels, & Tait Svenson, Note, UNCLOS and the Arctic:
The Path of Least Resistance, 30 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1587, 1597 (2007); Lalonde,
supra note 8, at 69-70 (discussing the International Court of Justice's case-specific
reasoning for upholding Norway's delimitation system).
192. See PHARAND, supra note 14 at 155.
193. See Fisheries Case, 1951 I.C.J. at 133; see also Jarashow et al., supra note
191, at 1598-99 (noting that the three factors were applied to baselines enclosing
inlets, fjords, bays, and the Norwegian skaergaard-the mass of islands and rocks
that border most of the Norwegian coastline). This geography is equally
complicated with the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. Id.
194. McRae, supra note 18, at 5.
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The first factor requires that baselines conform to the general
direction of the coastline.' 95  However, the ICJ emphasized that
baselines should follow the coastline to the extent that is
geographically possible, and must be reviewed reasonably.'
96
Canada's enclosure of its entire Arctic Archipelago is consistent with
the ICJ's conclusion in the Fisheries Case.197 The ICJ held that the
outline of the skjaergaard, or Norwegian Archipelago,1 98 determined
the actual Norwegian coastline. 199 Under this standard, the Canadian
Arctic coastline extends to the outer perimeter its coastal islands.
20 0
For this reason, Canada's baselines meet the ICJ's first constraint. 20 1
Canada's satisfies the second requirement of a close land to sea
link.20 z The presence of pack ice over its enclosed waters "bolsters
the physical unity between the Canadian land and the sea."
20 3
Despite the current climate change, Canada's argument remains valid
because ice sheets still connect the arctic waters to the mainland for a
portion of time each year. 204 Canada also meets the second factor
under the ratio of sea to land test.20 5 This test compares the ratio of
the land present within an archipelago to the total land area in that
same region.206  The sea to land ratio in the Canadian Arctic
195. Jarashow et al., supra note 191, at 1600. The term "coast" is inherently
ambiguous and is subject to interpretation. Id. at 1601 n.70; UNCLOS, supra note
26, art. 7(1).
196. See VanderZwaag & Pharand, supra note 186, at 63(stressing that the
criterion should be applied liberally because baselines might, within reasonable
limits, depart from the physical coastline). This concept is "devoid of any
mathematical precision." Id.
197. PHARAND, supra note 14, at 163.
198. Id. at 133 (defining the skjaergaard as the Norwegian archipelago comprised
of 120,000 insular indentions and a series of fjords).
199. Id. at 163.
200. See VanderZwaag & Pharand, supra note 186, at 63.
201. Donat Pharand, The Legal Regime of the Arctic: Some Outstanding Issues,
39 INT'L J. 742, 780 (1984) (noting that there are eighteen coastal archipelagos
where straight baselines have been accepted, despite indented coastline).
202. Jarashow et al., supra note 191, at 1602.
203. PHARAND, supra note 14 at 163.
204. Jarashow et al., supra note 191, at 1602.
205. Mark Killas, The Legality of Canada's Claims to the Waters of Its Arctic
Archipelago, 19 OTrAWA L. REv. 95, 119 (1987) (recommending this test to
interpret Article 7(3) of UNCLOS).
206. Jarashow et al., supra note 191, at 1602.
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Archipelago is .822 to 1.207 This test weighs heavily in Canada's
favor because the land to sea ratio in Canada's archipelago is actually
higher than that in the Norwegian skj aergaard.2 °8
Finally, Canada is in the unique position to invoke the third, non-
compulsory ICJ factor, because it can prove the longstanding
economic interest of the Inuit in Canada's Arctic waters. 20 9 When
setting forth the third requirement, the ICJ considered the fact that the
Norwegian fishermen lived for centuries off of the fish they caught in
the Norwegian coastal waterways.210  Similarly, the Canadian
indigenous populations have survived for centuries by harvesting the
Arctic's living resources. 211 This contribution is comparable to the
212
economic contribution of the Norwegian fishermen. Experts agree
that the lifestyle of the 20,000 Canadian Inuit presently living in the
Arctic is economically significant to the nation of Canada.213
Furthermore, the confederation of Nunavut allows Canada to
legitimately claim a sufficient economic interest in the northern
region because Canadian law is the governing law.214
The legality of Canada's straight baselines has been endorsed by
215many of the leading arctic experts as legally sound. However,
Article 8 of UNCLOS gives standing to the pre-existing navigation
regimes in place prior to the baseline proclamation. 216  In other
207. PHARAND, supra note 14 at 163.
208. See id. (reporting the Norwegian ratio as 3.5 to 1); see also Jarashow et al.,
supra note 191, at 1602.
209. PHARAND, supra note 14 at 163.
210. Id.; see also Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 115, 127-28 (Dec.
19) (discussing the history of the Norwegian fishermen).
211. See ACIA, supra note 61, at 91-92 (noting that the indigenous populations
have long relied on the harvest of arctic wildlife, including seals, walruses, polar
bears, whales, salmon and ptarmigan for survival).
212. Perry, supra note 7, at 675-76; Fisheries Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. at
127-28.
213. Jarashow et al., supra note 191, at 1602.
214. See YOUNG, supra note 116, at 1475-80 (describing the autonomy Nunavut
has given to the Inuit people); see also Perry, supra note 7, at 675-76 (discussing
the expected economic benefits the establishment of Nunavut will bring to both the
Inuit and to Canada).
215. See COTE & DUFRESNE, supra note 179, at 3 (citing Donat Pharand, The
Arctic Waters and the Northwest Passage: A Final Revisit, 38 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L
L. 3, 7 (2007) (providing a comprehensive discussion on the legal attributes of the
baseline theory)).
216. ROTHWELL & JOYNER, supra note 153, at 359.
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words, when newly proclaimed baselines enclose as internal waters
areas which had not previously been considered as such, a right of
innocent passage exists in those waters.2" 7 This is an inequitable
argument against Canada's sovereignty claim, because Canada has
long asserted that those waters are in fact, internal waters. 218 As
illustrated in the following section, Canada may rely on Historic
Consolidation of Title to Lancaster Sound and Barrow Strait in the
east and Amundsen Gulf in the west for additional evidence of its
sovereignty.
219
B. Historic Consolidation of Title: From Grisbadarna to the
Canadian Arctic
220
The effect of the Historic Consolidation of Title is to confirm, or
consolidate, "the title to those waters resulting from their enclosure
by straight baselines. 221  This doctrine is the most effective
argument for Canada because it is based on the law of equity. 222
Traditionally, title based on "historical consolidation" encompasses
sovereignty, recognition, consent, good faith, self-defense,
international responsibility, and freedom of the seas. Title to a region
is achieved by the "gradual solidification process" built on these
historical piers.223  Under a modem interpretation of Historic
Consolidation of Title, the nation most capable of protecting a
region's vital interests and its indigenous peoples is the sovereign
nation.
224
217. Id.
218. Id; PHARAND, supra note 14, at 178.
219. PHARAND, supra note 14, at 178.
220. Historic Consolidation of Title should not be confused with the Doctrine of
Historic Title. United States v. Alaska, 422 U.S. 184 (1975); Perry, supra note 7, at
665-66.
221. Id.
222. Macneill, supra note 10, at 355.
223. VanderZwaag & Pharand, supra note 186, at 74 n.92.
224. Perry, supra note 7, at 667; see Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, 1993
S.C., Art 15.1.1(c) (Can.) (demonstrating Canada's relationship with the Inuit
living in Nunavut); PHARAND, supra note 14, at 143 (focusing on the state's vital
interests as a key component to the doctrine).
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The Grisbadarna Case is the foundation for the theory of Historic
Consolidation of Title.225  The Grisbadarna Case assigned the
Grisbadarna banks to Sweden after analyzing both its use and the
claims made by Norwegian and Swedish fishermen.226 The court set
a series of three requirements to determine ownership, and Canada is
now able to meet the Grisbadarna factors: (1) discovery of land or
receipt of title from the previous sovereign; (2) administrative control
over the region; and (3) peaceful possession by the natural
inhabitants.227
1. Receipt of Title to the Arctic
Canada satisfies the first factor by the receipt of title to the region
from the Inuit. 228 The Inuit strongly believe that they are the owners
of the Arctic land.229 It is undisputed that the Inuit used the "ice
225. See The Grisbadama Case (Nor. v. Swed.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121, 130
(1916) (dictating the criteria to evaluate a nation's contention of title via historic
consolidation); See also Perry, supra note 7, at 667; Jarashow et al., supra note
191, at 1620-21 (discussing the Permanent Court of Arbitration's promulgation of
the historic consolidation of title doctrine); Michael Byers, The Need to Defend Our
New Northwest Passage, THETYEE.CA, Jan. 30, 2006,
http://thetyee.ca/Views/2006/01/30/DefendNorthwestPassage/ ("The historic
consolidation is also supported by [additional] judgments of international courts.
In 1975, in a dispute between Spain and Morocco over the Western Sahara, the
International Court of Justice held that the historic presence of nomadic peoples
can help to establish sovereignty." ). Michael Byers holds the Canada Research
Chair in Global Politics and International Law at the University of British
Columbia. See Crist, supra note 3 (featuring other material by Byers).
226. See The Grisbadarna Case, Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at 130-32 (holding that
the demarcation of the maritime boundary was supported by the fact that Swedish
nationals had a long history of lobster fishing in shoals of Grisbadama, exercised
dominion over the region, and maintained light-boats, whereas Norwegian
fisherman had fished for a shorter period of time).
227. Id.; Jarashow et al., supra note 191, at 1621.
228. See The Grisbadarna Case, Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) at 130-32 (holding that
cession from previous sovereigns is one definitive criteria to determine
sovereignty); see also Roy A. Perrin III, Comment, Crashing Through the Ice:
Legal Control of the Northwest Passage or Who Shall Be 'Emperor of the North',
13 TUL. MAR. L.J. 139, 151-53 (1988) (suggesting that Canada's Inuit population is
comparable to that of the Swedish Nationals in The Grisbadama Case and satisfies
the first requirement set out in the decision).
229. INUIT CIRCUMPOLAR COUNCIL (CANADA), ANNUAL REPORT 2006-2007
(2008). The annual publication of the Inuit Circumpolar Council (Canada) refers to
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cover of the Northwest Passage as part of their livelihood throughout
their habitation," and, therefore, bestowed sovereignty on themselves,
and in turn, on Canada.23 ° Canada's argument for receipt of title is
bolstered further by the Inuit negotiations with the Canadian
government during the establishment of Nunavut.
231
2. Today's Canada is Upholding Administrative Control
The Canada of today is successfully asserting administrative
control of the Arctic by safeguarding the ecosystem and people of the
Arctic.232 In line with the equitable principles of the doctrine,
Canada should argue the modem principal that the nation closest to
the environmental crisis will exercise the most effective control, as it
has the greatest stake in the negative consequences.
233
a. A Modernized Definition of the Term "Control"
In the Grisbadarna Case, assertive control was tantamount to
actual force. 234  It is unreasonable for any nation to assume that
today's definition of the word control is the same as that intended in
the Arctic as the Inuit original homeland and instructs the Canadian government
and international community to continue working with the Inuit as an equal partner
having a prior claim to the Arctic. Id.
230. Jarashow et al., supra note 191, at 1621.
231. MCGRATH, supra note 115, at 262. Canada should also assert that the
discoveries made by the English and French explorers should satisfy the first
element. See ROTHWELL & JOYNER, supra note 153, at 334 (detailing the
discoveries of English and French explorers of the Northern Arctic territories).
Jarashow et al., supra note 191, at 1622.
232. MCGRATH, supra note 115, at 262-63; Byers, supra note 225. The
International Court of Justice holds that the number of occupants necessary to
establish title over territory is lower in inhospitable regions than in more temperate
climates, and that number is based upon what is appropriate for that region. Perry,
supra note 7, at 673-74.
233. BREIDE & SAUNDERS, supra note 16, at 82 ("The activities and areas
concerned should, so far as possible, engage the particular interest of a State or
States likely to take a pro-conservation stance with respect to conserving
biodiversity in the area. Other areas distant from coastal states should not be
forgotten, but given that actual regulatory action requires the participation of states,
progress is more likely to be achieved where some states see their interests as
affected.").
234. The Grisbadarna Case (Nor. v. Swed.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121, 130-32
(1916).
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the 1909 Grisbadarna Case.235 Restricting Canada's argument for
control to its military capabilities is both inequitable and archaic.
Modem methods, including legislation, necessary military
enforcement, and community action, will protect the Arctic
waterways from environmental devastation and terrorism, and
therefore, must comprise the new definition of control.236 Canada is
currently employing the above methods to defend its Arctic
sovereignty.
b. Canada's Unrivaled Environmental Control
Canada's resources are controlled and safeguarded by
comprehensive environmental protection legislation. 237  Most
obvious is the AWPPA, which will be broadened, should Bill C-3
pass.2 38 From a protected area perspective, several federal statutes
defend Canada's Arctic waters and EEZ.239 These include the Oceans
Act (marine protected areas), the Canada Wildlife Act (marine
wildlife areas), the Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act
(marine conservation areas), and the Migratory Birds Convention
Act, 1994, which prevents vessels from depositing substances
harmful to migratory birds.24 ° The Department of Fisheries and
Oceans, together with other federal departments, enacted the Federal
Marine Protected Areas Strategy and The Fisheries Act to prevent
overfishing and to protect breeding sites in Canada's territorial sea
and internal Arctic waters. 24 1 The Canada Shipping Act of 2001 is
235. NATALIE MYCHAJLYSZYN, THE ARCTIC: CANADIAN SECURITY AND
DEFENSE 1 (Parliamentary Info. and Res. Serv. Pub., PRB 08-13E, 2008) (noting
that the effects of climate change and technology have added another dimension to
Arctic security and defense strategy).
236. See Sheppard, supra note 33 (quoting expert Robert Huebert's explanation
of breadth of threats facing the changing Arctic).
237. COTE & DUFRESNE, supra note 179, at 3.
238. An Act to Amend Arctic Waters Pollution Prevention Act, 2009, Bill C-3,
4 0 th Parl. (Can.).
239. See VANDERZWAAG ETAL., supra note 19, at 51-52.
240. Id.; see Canada National Marine Conservation Areas Act, 2002 S.C., ch. 18
(Can.); Oceans Act, 1996 S.C., ch. 31 (Can.); Migratory Birds Conventions Act,
1994 S.C., ch. 22. (Can.); Canada Wildlife Act, R.S.C. ch. W-9 (1985) (Can.).
241. COTI & DUFRESNE, supra note 179, at 3; VANDERZWAAG ET AL., supra note
19, at 51.
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especially relevant to pollution control in the Arctic.14  The Act
regulates the management of ballast water for all vessels, including
foreign ships in Canadian waters and in the EEZ, and covers
pollution discharges outside of the one hundred nautical mile
pollution prevention zone in Arctic waters. 243
The Species at Risk Act in Canada provides a comprehensive
protection plan for species that are listed as endangered or threatened,
and a prevention program for species determined as vulnerable. 24
Environment Canada and the Canadian Wildlife Service (CWS)
receive support and authority from Canada's environmental
legislation. 245 CWS manages sixteen Migratory Bird Sanctuaries and
246two National Wildlife Areas in NWT and Nunavut. Their
responsibilities not only include conservation actions but also the
exercise of control over the protection efforts in coastal areas.247
Primary management activities include the development of
management plans, the review of permit applications, and the
production of public information. 248 The Nunavut Land Claim
Agreement (NLCA) requires management plans for all CWS
protected areas in the Nunavut Settlement Area, and the negotiation
of Inuit Impact and Benefit Agreements for many of them.249 This
active involvement recognizes the importance of those indigenous
peoples who have long relied on Arctic resources. 25  CWS does not
exert a traditional military control; rather, they partner with the
organizations that create energy policy and thereby, exert effective
242. VANDERZWAAG ET AL., supra note 19, at 54; Canada Shipping Act, 2001
S.C., ch. 26. (Can.).
243. Id.
244. Species at Risk Act, 2003 S.C., ch. 29 (Can.).
245. See generally Environment Canada, Legislation and Agreements,
http://www.pnr-rpn.ec.gc.ca/pollution/eOOsO9.en.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2009)
(providing an explanation of the programs and legislation sponsored by
Environment Canada).
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id. See also Nunavut Land Claims Agreement Act, 1993 S.C., ch. 29 (Can.).
250. See YOUNG, supra note 116, at 1475-80 (noting the importance of the
Inuit's policy influence in Nunavut).
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influence and control over energy resource management. 2 1  Their
partners include the Renewable Resource Board, the Renewable
Resource Council, wildlife co-management boards, local Hunters and
Trappers Organizations, and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated.252
i. The Problem of Pollution
The effectiveness of Canada's legislation is critical to Canada's
exertion of environmental control. In such an exceptional ecosystem,
"the emphasis [must] be on the prevention of pollution, instead of
remedial measures." 253 As previously mentioned, the Arctic
pollution problem is a focus of Canada's environmental protection
legislation and a serious concern for the Canadian community. The
two types of Arctic pollution, extra-regional pollution and intra-
regional pollution, are almost impossible to remove.2 54 The Arctic is
especially susceptible to extra-regional sources of pollution. 255 The
source of this type of pollution is often remote from the polar areas
themselves. 256 Extra-regional pollution is difficult to control because
the damage has generally occurred by the time the pollutant is
discovered.257 The persistent organic pollutants of extra-regional
origin are dangerous to the indigenous population for whom the local
food sources remain important dietary and cultural resources. 258 This
type of pollution is almost impossible to remove prior to harm
251. See Canadian Wildlife Service, Management of Protected Areas,
http://www.mb.ec.gc.ca/nature/ecb/da02s09.en.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2009)
(explaining the goals and partners of CWS).
252. Id.
253. INTRODUCTION TO PROTECTING THE POLAR MARINE ENVIRONMENT: LAW
AND POLICY FOR POLLUTION PREVENTION 11 (Davor Vidas ed., 2000) [hereinafter
MARINE ENVIRONMENT].
254. See id. at 9. The term intra-regional pollution has been introduced in this
Article to summarize the type of pollution generated within the same region it
affects.
255. Id.
256. See id. (citing W. C. Camplin & M. D. Hill, Sea Dumping of Solid
Radioactive Waste: A New Assessment, 7 RADIOACTIVE WASTE MGMT. AND THE
NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE 242 (1986) (discussing the environmental impact of the
dumping of radioactive waste in the Arctic and Antarctic waters).
257. See MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 253, at 9.
258. Id.
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because it is consumed unknowingly by those who depend upon the
Arctic ecosystem for survival.259
Intra-regional pollution is derived from activity within the Arctic
itself.260 Even a marginal increase in Arctic shipping or development
will create intra-regional pollution within this particularly fragile
ecosystem. Because the continued reduction of ice will lengthen the
navigation season and increase marine access to the Arctic, Canadian
regulation is necessary to guarantee an immediate response in the
event of a shipping accident.
261
Experts predict that the Northwest Passage will be especially
vulnerable to intra-regional pollution. 262 The anticipated increase in
industrial activities, exploration, and ship traffic will generate a
disproportionate burden of pollutants entering the Passage. 263 The
synergistic effects of the new development may result in "an
increased incidence of epizootics among the marine species residing
in the Northwest Passage. 2 64 Marine mammals, "as long-lived apex
consumers with high lipid content, have a [greater] potential for long-
term accumulation of contaminants.265
The impact of ship-source pollution is exacerbated in semi-
enclosed seas like the Arctic Ocean. 2 66  Geography imposes
hydrological limitations, which trap non-biodegradable waste in the
region's marine environment for decades.267  It is, therefore,
imperative that emphasis be placed on the prevention ship-source
pollution.
268
259. See ACIA, supra note 61, at 11 (explaining that many Indigenous peoples
depend on hunting polar bear, walrus, seals, caribou, and fishing, not only for food
and economic support, but for the foundation of cultural and social identity).
260. Id.
261. See id. at 82; see also Mayeda, supra note 169 (noting that AWPPA
mandates immediate notification in the event of an accident).
262. See Cynthia T. Tynan & Douglas P. DeMaster, Observations and
Predictions of Arctic Climate Change: Potential Effects on Marine Mammals, 50
ARCTIC 308, 317 (1997) (highlighting the Northwest Passage as a region of
particular concern to environmental researchers).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 318.
266. VANDERZWAAG ET AL., supra note 19, at 24.
267. Id.
268. Id.
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An oil spill in an ice-covered area is also exceptionally
dangerous. 269  Thick-billed Murres, for example, suffer substantial
mortality due to Arctic transport of oil. 270 At this time, there are no
effective methods to remove hydrocarbon pollutants from ice-
infested waters. 271 Oil spilled on or under ice cannot be cleaned by
272the same technologies used in warmer waters.
ii. The Arctic Ecosystem
When left undisturbed, the polar marine ecosystems are "among
the most productive ecosystems in the world., 273 Given the harsh
Arctic climate, this fact may seem counterintuitive; however, polar
waters are particularly conducive to marine life. 2 74 When compared
to warmer waterways, Arctic temperatures better support the
necessary nutrient growth.275  In addition, the subtle temperature
fluctuations direct the seasonal bloom of ice algae, thus balancing the
migration and breeding patterns at every level of the food web.27 6
However, the equilibrium of the Arctic ecosystem is uniquely
vulnerable to both climate change and human interference. 277
The direct effect of climate change and Arctic development is the
loss of ice-associated habitats. 278 This change most affects Arctic
pinnipeds, as they depend on ice-pack for pupping, foraging, and
279resting. Polar bears, which prey on pinnipeds, are also suffering
269. See MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 253, at 11.
270. Canadian Wildlife Service, Population Dynamics of Thick-Billed Murres,
http://www.mb.ec.gc.ca/nature/ecb/da02s 18.en.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
271. VanderZwaag, supra note 253, at 27.
272. Id.
273. MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 253, at 10-11.
274. See id. (noting that colder waters are especially rich in the nutrients essential
to marine life).
275. Id.
276. See Tynan & DeMaster, supra note 262, at 914 (explaining that ice algal
cells initiate a seasonal bloom of phytoplankton, which sustains the secondary
production required to support High Arctic marine mammals).
277. See id. at 11.
278. See id. at 312.
279. Id. The primary Arctic pinnipeds are the ringed seal, bearded seal, and the
Walrus. Id. The Ringed Seal requires snow cover and fast ice in order construct a
pupping lair. Id. In contrast, both the bearded seal and the walrus require ice thick
enough to hold their weight, yet thin enough to puncture, creating a breathing hole.
Id. at 313.
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from a diminished habitat. 280  They are the only marine mammal
habitually occupying landfast coastal sea ice.
2 81
An altered habitat subsequently causes indirect effects, felt at every
level of the food web.282 Sympagic communities are especially
vulnerable to these effects, which include shifts in prey availability,
283
reproductive cycles, and migration patterns. The availability of
prey in the sympagic community fluctuates with the slightest
environmental change. 284 Because the Arctic has a relatively low
number of species, and each species maintains a large population, the
food chains of Arctic marine species are characteristically short.
285
The following, an example of the food web operating in the Baffin
Bay, illustrates the interdependence of each Arctic species. 286
Beginning at the secondary production level, ice algae mats prompt
the bloom of phytoplankton, which becomes the principal food of the
arctic cod.287 The arctic cod is the pivotal species in the food web
because it supports the belugas, narwhals, harp seals, ringed seals,
bearded seals, and hooded seals. 288 The polar bear is then at the
highest trophic level, preying on other marine mammals.28 9
Arctic conditions require that each species has a short, site-specific
breeding season. 29  Degradation of the Arctic environment will
result in irreparable damage, because these species cannot easily
"relocate" to another area. 29 1  For example, the Nirjutiqavvik
National Wildlife Area is essential because it protects the primary
nesting site of Northern Fulmars, Black-legged Kittiwakes, and
280. John M. Broder & Andrew C. Revkin, Warming May Wipe Out Most Polar
Bears, Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 2007, at Al1, (melting ice is causing
irreparable harm to the polar bear habitat, access to food, and breeding sites).
281. Id.; Tynan & DeMaster, supra note 262, at 312.
282. Tynan & DeMaster, supra note 262, at 312.
283. Id. at 312-14 (defining a "sympagic" environment as where water exists
mostly as solid ice).
284. Id.; MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 253, at 11.
285. MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 253, at 11.
286. Tynan & DeMaster, supra note 262, at 314.
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 312.
290. MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 253, at 11.
291. Id.
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Thick-billed Murres. 292 Like other Arctic animals, aspects of Thick-
billed Murre breeding biology, including diet, timing of laying, adult
mass, and chick growth are dependent upon environmental
stability.293 Furthermore, researchers predict that the opening of the
Canadian Arctic may alter the gene flow within marine species,
thereby reducing the genetic diversity. 294 A particular concern is for
the beluga whale. 295 Scientists speculate that "a lengthening in the
open-water season in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago might alter the
timing and geographical patterns of seasonal migrations as well as the
time spent in select summering or wintering grounds." 296 "Sufficient
changes in beluga behavior may promote genetic exchange between
stocks," yielding uncertain consequences.297
Scientists agree that on-site, risk-adverse management strategies
298must be implemented within the Canadian Arctic. Special
protection and research must be afforded to "indicator species," such
as the beluga whale and the polar bear, because the condition of an
indicator species reflects the condition of the Arctic at large. 299 The
Canadian government is demonstrating its vested interest in Arctic
preservation by providing the recommended on-site monitoring of its
indicator species. The beluga, recently named a Species of Special
Concern, is now being closely monitored, and is under consideration
for addition to its Species at Risk Act. 30 0 The 2008 assessment by the
292. Canadian Wildlife Service, Field Projects: Key Habitat Sites,
http://www.pnr-rpn.ec.gc.
ca/nature/ecb/da02sO9.en.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
293. Id.
294. Tynan & DeMaster, supra note 262, at 317.
295. Id. Populations of belugas in the Mackenzie Delta (Beaufort Sea) and Arviat
(West Hudson Bay) regions have been genetically separate for 3900 years. Id.
296. Id. ("At present, the eastern Canadian stock of belugas arrives in the High
Arctic in late June and early July and migrates westward through Lancaster Sound
to summering areas in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago. From the opposite
direction, in the southern Beaufort Sea, male belugas have been tracked as far
northward and eastward as Viscount Melville Sound in the summer returning to the
Bering Sea during the winter." (citation omitted)).
297. Id.
298. Id. at 318.
299. See generally Tynan & DeMaster, supra note 262 (providing a
comprehensive discussion of marine mammals as indicator species).
300. See Fisheries and Oceans Canada, The Beluga Whale (Eastern High Arctic-
Baffin Bay), http://www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/species-especes/species-especes/beluga-
east-beluga-est-eng.htm (last visited Jan. 9, 2010).
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Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada
(COSEWIC) classified the polar bears' status as "special concern." 30 1
During Bill C-3's Second Reading in the House of Commons,
Member of Parliament Don Davis made the following remark about
the broader implications of the polar bear crisis and its importance as
an indicator species, "What is most alarming about the threats to this
species is that it exists at the highest level of the food chain. If we
have problems at that level of higher order mammals, that is a
harbinger of deep problems environmentally in the north., 30 2
This depth of understanding is the reason Canadians are more
likely to take a step towards protection and control than their
American neighbors. 303 The management of polar bears in Canada is
the responsibility of the specific provincial and territorial
governments in which they live. 30 4  However, two national
committees, comprised of technical experts and senior wildlife
managers, are meeting to review research results and to consider the
addition of the polar bear as a "species at risk. 30 5 This is a sharp
contrast to the American agenda. 30 6  The state of Alaska, in a
decision announced by Governor Sarah Palin, is currently suing the
United States Secretary of the Interior in an attempt to remove polar
bears from the Threatened Species list under the US Endangered
301. Committee on the Status of Endangered Wildlife in Canada, Bear, Polar,
http://www.cosewic.gc.ca/eng/sctl/searchdetaile.cfm?id= 167&StartRow= 1 &boxS
tatus=All&boxTaxonomic=All&location=All&change=All&board=All&commonN
ame=polar%20bear&scienceName=&returnFlag=0&Page=1 (last visited Jan. 9,
2010). As a result of Arctic development and climate change, scientists predict that
two-thirds of the world's polar bear population will disappear by 2050. Justin
Olsson, Comment, The Future of the Polar Bear Rests on Thin Ice: Listing Under
the ESA and Its Impacts, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL'Y 46, 46 (2007).
302. HOUSE OF COMMONS DEBATES (Hansard), 018 (Feb. 25, 2009) at 1550 (Mr.
Don Davies) (Can.), available at http://www2.parl.gc.ca/House
Publications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode= 1 &Parl=40&Ses=2&Docld=3
694590&File=0.
303. Martha Neil, Alaska Sues Feds Over Polar Bear Listing as Threatened
Species, A.B.A. J., Aug. 5, 2008,
http://abajoumal.com/news/alaska-suesfeds-over-polar-bearlisting.as-threaten
edspecies/.
304. Species at Risk Act Public Registry, Polar Bear,
http://www.sararegistry.gc.ca/species
/speciesDetailse.cfm?sid= 167 (last visited Jan. 19, 2009).
305. Id.
306. See Neil, supra note 303.
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Species Act because protection will interfere with oil and gas
drilling. 30
7
c. Canada is Enforcing its Regulations
It is, therefore, both reasonable and environmentally responsible
for the Canadian government to insist upon the freedom to govern all
shipping, harvesting of resources, and exploration within this
region. 30 8 Canada's insistence is proving successful. Transport
Canada, Fisheries and Oceans, the Canadian Coast Guard,
Environment Canada, and the Department of National Defense and
Justice Canada are working together to administer effective control
over ship-source marine pollution in Canadian waters. 30 9 Recently, a
fuel barge operated by the Northern Transportation Company Ltd.
pled guilty to a charge under AWPPA for unlawfully depositing
waste, oil or an oil mixture into Arctic Waters. 310 Following an
investigation by Transport Canada, a court in Kuglutuk, Nunavut
fined the company $10,000 for spilling 1,000 liters of diesel fuel into
the Coronation Gulf near Nunavut.311 In February of 2009, the vessel
BBC Nordland spilled 300 liters of oil and was ordered to pay a
$15,000 penalty for illegally discharging a pollutant in Canadian
waters. 3 12 As explained above, the consequences of an oil spill can
have a devastating environmental impact. 31 3 Canada's willingness to
enforce their environmental regulations should certainly be
considered "administering control" within Historic Consolidation of
Title, and there can be no question that the added reporting provisions
under NORDREG will enhance Canada's control over the Arctic
waters. 
3 14
307. Id.
308. See Byers, supra note 225.
309. Press Release, Transport Canada, Marine Polluter Penalized $15,000 for Oil
Spill (Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/atl/2009/09-aOO 1 e.htm.
310. Press Release, Transport Canada, Arctic Marine Polluter Edgar Kotokak
Fined $10,000 (July 7, 2008), available at
http://www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/pnr/2008/08-pnO59e.htm.
311. Id.
312. Press Release, supra note 309.
313. Id.; MARINE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 253, at 11.
314. Canadian American Strategic Review: Standing Senate Committee on
Fisheries and Oceans Report on the Canadian Coast Guard, Icebreakers, and Arctic
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Equally important to a strong Arctic voice in Parliament is the role
of the Inuit in Canada's national security. 315 The Canadian Rangers,
comprised almost solely of Inuit and First Nations members, are part-
time reservists who provide a military presence in the Arctic
region. 316 This unit was revitalized in 2006, and today there are
nearly 5,000 Rangers across Canada. 317  In response to the March
2009 Russian aggression, the number of Canadian Rangers will be
increased to "improve surveillance and response capabilities and
expand overall presence in the North., 318  The Canadian Rangers
strengthen Canada's strategic capabilities in the North because they
operate in areas which cannot be conveniently or economically
patrolled by other branches of the Canadian Forces. 319 The Rangers
are responsible for protecting Canada's sovereignty by reporting
unusual activities, collecting local data of significance for the
Canadian Forces, leading Northern Warning System patrols, and
conducting surveillance and sovereignty patrols. 320  The national
security role of the Canadian Rangers is so critical that Yukon, in
response to the current sovereignty crisis, is amending its
Employment Standards Act to provide job protection for Rangers
who take time from work for military service.
Sovereignty, (June/Aug. 2008), http://www.casr.ca/doc-dfo-senate-arctic-l.htm,
(last visited Jan. 19, 2009) [hereinafter Strategic Review].
315. See MYCHAJLYSZYN, supra note 235, at 4; see also Perry, supra note 7, at
672-73.
316. See Canadian Army, Canadian Rangers, http://www.armee.
forces.gc.ca/land-terre/cr-rc/index-eng.asp (last visited Feb. 10, 2010) [hereinafter
Canadian Rangers].
317. Id.; see MYCHAJLYSZYN, supra note 235, at 4.
318. Russia Plans Arctic Military Force, CANADIAN PRESS, Mar. 27, 2009
(quoting National Defence and Canadian Forces Communications director, Dan
Dugas).
319. Id.; Canadian Rangers, supra note 316.
320. Id.
321. CBC News, Rangers Get Job Protection as Sovereignty Issue Heats Up,
Mar. 27, 2009, CBC.CA, http://www.cbc.ca/canada/north/story/2009/03/27/yukon-
rangers.html (noting that legislation makes it an both an offense to refuse to hire
workers because of their Ranger service, and an offense to fire, demote, or
discipline workers who take time off for Ranger service).
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3. Peaceful Possession by the Inuit
The final factor to establish Canadian sovereignty is the
Grisbadarna Case requirement demonstrating peaceful possession by
the natural inhabitants. 322 Canada not only answers this requirement,
it goes above and beyond. The natural inhabitants, or indigenous
people, are the same individuals who both live peacefully in the
Arctic and act as Canada's frontline for Arctic security and
control. 3
23
Members of First Nations, M~tis, and Inuit are the natural
inhabitants of Canada and have a longstanding dependence on Arctic
resources. 324 Because "sovereignty is held important if it is sought to
ensure the welfare of people who inhabit a region," the protection of
the indigenous economy and overall vitality is essential to Canada's
successful assertion of Arctic sovereignty. 3 25 In prior years, the Inuit
Relocation, poor economic conditions in Arctic communities and
lack of Parliamentary representation have all but negated Canadian
claims under Consolidation of Historic Title. 326 However, the Inuit
and the Canadian government have made great strides in repairing
their relationship. 327  The Inuit are now actively involved in the
governance, security, and welfare of not just the Arctic, but all of
Canada. 328 The Confederation of Nunavut solidifies Canada's
sovereignty claim because Canadian law is now applied throughout
the territory. 329 As previously stated, a regional court in Nunavut
successfully enforced the federal AWAPPA regulations against
Arctic polluters, and this was made possible by cooperation between
the residents of Nunavut, Transport Canada, and the Canadian Coast
322. The Grisbadarna Case (Nor. v. Swed.), Hague Ct. Rep. (Scott) 121, 130-32
(1916).
323. Perry supra note 7, at 672-73.
324. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act
1982 (U.K.), 1982, ch. 11.
325. Perry, supra note 7, at 675.
326. Id. at 674-76.
327. MCGRATH, supra note 115, at 262-63. See generally ROYAL COMMISSION
ON ABORIGINAL PEOPLES, REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON ABORIGINAL
PEOPLES, VOL. 1: LOOKING FORWARD, LOOKING BACK (1996) (discussing Canada's
past treatment of its indigenous population and its plans to rebuild a positive
relationship).
328. MCGRATH, supra note 115 at 262-63.
329. Nunavut Act, 1993 ch. 28, s. 2; 1998, ch.15 (Can.).
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Guard. 330 The application of Canadian law in Nunavut guarantees
government funding, representation in Parliament, and most
importantly, validates Canadian control in the Arctic region.
33
'
The Canadian Government also advocates for Inuit culture and
welfare on the international stage. 332 For generations, the Canadian
Inuit have hunted seals and exported seal products, contributing
approximately $13 million to the Northern economy. 333 In 2009, the
European Union introduced a ban on seal products. 334 Prior to this
ban's enactment, the Canadian government introduced new seal
hunting regulations. 335 The purpose was to simultaneously meet the
EU's standard for a humane hunt and, at the same time, preserve the
cultural traditions and source of funding for their Inuit citizens.
336
While not completely satisfactory to either group, the regulations
worked to preserve peace between the Canadian government and the
EU as well as between Canada's government and its citizens. 337 As a
result of Canadian lobbying for the Inuit, the EU ban included an
exception for seal products from the Canadian Inuit. 338  The
Canadian Environment Minister has promised the Inuit continued
negotiations with the EU to ensure that their sale of seal products
remains profitable, while implementing the humane hunting
standards expected by the global community.
339
Finally, the Canadian Rangers play an important role in advancing
public recognition of Canada's First Nations and Inuit groups.
340
They are widely known for their frequent selfless contributions to
their communities, 341 including participation in The Junior Canadian
330. Press Release, supra note 310.
331. Perry, supra note 7, at 675-76.
332. CBC News, Inuit Denounce Proposed EU Seal-Products Ban Despite
Exemption, CBC.CA, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.cbc.ca/
canada/north/story/2009/03/05/seal-ban.html; Jeff Davis, New Seal Regs Aim to
Stave off EU Ban, EMBASSYMAG.CA, Jan. 14, 2009,
http://www.embassymag.ca/page/printpage/sealhunt- 1-14-2009.
333. See Davis, supra note 333.
334. Id.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Canadian Rangers, supra note 316.
341. Id.
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Rangers program.342 The Program is funded by the Department of
National Defense and the Canadian Forces, Indian and Northern
Affairs Canada and private corporations, 343 and provides a positive
alternative to over 4,000 "at-risk" youth in remote and isolated
communities. 
344
The traditional livelihood and culture of the Inuit is of vital interest
to the coastal state of Canada, and the welfare of the Inuit community
is inextricably linked to the health of the marine environment and
Canadian national security. 345 Therefore, Canadian title to the Arctic
Archipelago arises out of its administrative control over these waters
and its longstanding commitment to protect its vital state interests.
34 6
For these reasons, Canada is in a position to rely on Historic
Consolidation of Title as a subsidiary basis in order to consolidate the
title resulting from Canada's use of the straight baseline system. 
347
VII.CONCLUSION
The melting Arctic waterways will soon provide unfettered access
to natural resources, and this access will cause irreparable
environmental harm unless carefully regulated. The Canada of today
has demonstrated the desire and genuine ability to preserve the
Arctic. This commitment is unlike anything the international
community has seen from Canada previously. Canada is
implementing policies and practices which not only prove that
Canada is best suited to protect its Northern Region, but also that it
can now assert a sovereignty claim sustainable at international law.
Canada has long established the validity of its straight baselines, and
the international community must recognize Canadian sovereignty
over the Arctic Archipelago. However, Title by Historic
342. National Defence and the Canadian Forces, Junior Canadian Rangers:
Overview, http://www.rangers.dnd.ca/ove-ape/index-eng.asp (last visited Mar. 6,
2009).
343. Id.
344. Id.
345. See PHARAND, supra note 14, at 176-77 (noting that the Inuit's dependence
on marine resources is an integral part of their culture and livelihood); see id. at
177 (discussing Canada's vulnerability to submarines in the Northwest Passage
should it not be considered sovereign waters).
346. Id. at 178.
347. Id. at 145-46.
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Consolidation is now a crucial subsidiary argument for Canada.
First, the longstanding occupation of the Arctic by indigenous
persons and the negotiations with the Inuit during the confederation
of Nunavut arguably provide for the passing of title from the Inuit to
the State of Canada. Second, Canada can and is currently enforcing
administrative control over the Arctic waterways. The definition of
control must be modernized to include environmental and cultural
preservation. The latest amendment to AWPPA is just one example
of Canada's willingness to assert control within the international
community. Canada's argument is more persuasive today than ever
before because those assisting in administering control are also the
natural inhabitants of the Arctic. The confederation of Nunavut
ensures that Canadians living in the North have a political presence in
Ottawa, an advocate on the international stage, and a unique role in
sovereignty protection via the Canadian Rangers. Those nations who
question Canada's commitment to enforcing sovereignty or want only
to consume resources from a distance must submit to a new, equitable
direction in sovereignty determination. Canada is the Arctic nation
facing the greatest risk of harm from overexploitation and increased
shipping. Canada, therefore, is in the best position to scrutinize the
harvest of resources, protect the backyards of Arctic Canadians, and
effectively voice concerns for today's Arctic.
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